

THE REDYNAMISATION OF THE RUSSO-AFRICAN RELATIONS: WHICH STAKES GEOPOLITQUES AND GEOSTRATEGIQUES FOR AFRICA IN XXIE CENTURY?

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Abstract: *The attractiveness of Africa today is undeniable. All areas and sectors of activity are coveted by all of its partners, as evidenced by the proliferation of international investments and the multiplication of diplomatic actions on the continent. Considered as a continent of all opportunities, Africa represents a new center of the world with regard to the diversity of the areas at stake: the economy, education, the environment, security and many others. Partnership relations between Africa and external powers are very old. But they will intensify at the end of the cold war from the 1990s. However, the situation seems to be balanced with the rise of Russia in Africa, which have long-standing relations. They have recently taken a new turn, with several bilateral initiatives and the rise of the BRICS multilateral forum where Russia is very active.*

Keywords: Russia, Africa, partner, diplomatic action, power

1. Introduction

The African continent arouses a great interest that today, one regularly intends to say by specialists as Anthony Mangeon who "Africa is the future of the world" (Mangeon, 2021). In spite of the recurring difficulties, the objective reasons of such a renewed interest for Africa in XXIe century are actually well-known. Since the middle of the Fifties until the brutal change of the national and foreign policies, associated the reforms undertaken by Mikhail Gorbatchev at the end of the Eighties, the Soviet Union was very active in the African continent. In its fight against the imperialism, the USSR really discovered Africa only tardily, and paradoxically at the moment of the decolonizations. Admittedly, it supported movements of release Marxists and anti-impérialistes, though enough mollement at that time. But, with the wind of the emancipation, the new independent States gradually will escape from now on the colonial supervision, while being able to diversify their foreign relations. Especially, they saw even arriving at the capacity of the often penetrated teams of culture Marxist-Leninist, moreover sometimes acquired in Russia.

Actually, the Russian presence in Africa did not resist weakening, then with the fall of the USSR, nor with the domination without division for a time of the Western world and the United States. However, after a long successive period of withdrawal to the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991 (Kozovoi, 2023), the Russians develop today a policy of return on the African continent (Arkhangelskaya, 2013). Undoubtedly, this renewed interest of Russia for Africa intervenes overall today, at the moment when the African States are activated to diversify their partnerships more, inter alia escaping dependency of China become impossible to circumvent on the continent, or with that of the traditional partners who are the Western countries. Jointly, one binds these last years the return somewhat accelerated of Russia on the African continent, particularly with the first crisis ukrainienne of 2014.

2. Birth of a tumultuous ideological relation between Moscow and Africa of 1950 to 2002

As of the years 1950, many programs of exchanges and formation began. The Soviet Union signs hundreds of agreements with the African countries. Approximately 25 000 Africans are trained in the universities and Soviet technical schools, in multiple fields, and thousands leave the military academies and political of the USSR. But the situation changes

with the turning of the years 1990, with the "fall" of the Soviet Union and other political and social changes. This new era is marked by the rupture of the diplomatic relations with the majority of the African countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union cuts practically all the bonds and puts an end to the ideological mission of the USSR for the propagation of socialism.

2.1. The engagement of post-war period of the Soviet ex-Union in Africa of 1950 to 1980

The engagement of post-war period of the Soviet ex-Union in Africa started in the middle of the years 1950 with the Conference of Bandung (1955) of the Asian and African countries non-aligned. The Soviet approach of "against-impérialisme" was the official ideology which emerged during second half of the years 1960 (Barratt, 1981). However, actually, the African policy of Moscow was a mixture of ideology and realpolitik which had been worked by the geopolitical competition of the USSR at the time of the cold war until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Matusevich, 2003). Russia and the majority of the African leaders shared a common vision of the anticolonialism, "modernization" and construction of the nation, stimulated in particular by the Russian interest for the resources and the markets of Africa. A remarkable example is the support of Nikita Khrouchtchev for the first Prime Minister of the democratic Republic of Congo independent (in the past Belgian Congo), Patrice Lumumba, who was assassinated by allies of the Occident because of leaning sound supposed for the "communist" ideologies.

Although Moscow considered African socialism, as propagated by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Sékou Touré of Guinea (Conakry) and Modibo Keita in Mali, like a deviation malvenue of "true" Socialism Marxist-Leninist, it provided a help, a military support and an authorized capital, for example, grants for African students, studying in Russia (Kohnert, 2022: 2).

Immediately after the independence of the old African colonial States at the beginning of the years 1960, and the cold war, the students of almost all the African countries, that they are of socialist "or" capitalist "orientation", studied in the USSR. A major destination was the University Patrice Lumumba of Moscow, founded in 1960 to help the developing countries recently become independent. On the whole, 56 000 students of the ASS studied in this most significant university for the Arab and African students within the old socialist block (King, 1964: 139-143). When the Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, it counted 47 312 graduates of the Arab countries and 43 500 more of the African countries, for the majority studying medicine or engineering (King, 1964: 139-143). Since 1979, the African students in Russia were more numerous than those which studied in the United Kingdom. However, the University of Lumumba was often considered by the Africans a discriminatory institution, even racist.

Thus, the African countries virtually exceeded socialist "and" capitalist "competitor blocks the" Westerners at various levels. After Perestroïka, the attractiveness of the Russian universities for the African and Arab students strongly declined before being rectified gradually at the end of the years 1990 (Yengo and Saint-Martin, 2017: 226).

According to its policy of "against-impérialisme", the Kremlin was sufficiently opportunist to cooperate with a broad range of country, energy of more "the progressists" to more "the reactionaries". In West Africa, that included/understood for example beside Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Senegal also the Côte.d'ivoire and Nigeria, the second greater economy African, beside South Africa, where Moscow supported the ANC during the fight anti-apartheid (Legvold, 1970). The relations Nigerian-Soviet reached their apogee during the civil war Nigerian of 1967-1970 in Biafra (Matusevich, 2003).

2.2. Russian disengagement of the African continent of 1990 to 2002

If the decade 1990 is marked by a generalized retreat of the positions of Russia on the international scene, except notable for China, Africa is the area of the world where this

process is fastest and most marked. Since 1992, Moscow announces the closing of its diplomatic structures and arts centres of which it laid out hitherto on the continent. The majority of the offices of the news services ex-Soviet which were often used as cover to the KGB and with the GRU, are dismantled fault of financings and interest on behalf of the Center. Trade between Africa and Russia does not represent any more but less than 2% of the trade foreign of the country (Birgerson, Alexander, Kozhemiakin, Kanet, 1996: 154).

In the prolongation of the policy of Gorbatchev (Webber, 1992: 15), the Eltsine administration disengages Russia of Africa, synonymous with economic arrieration and ruinous geopolitical adventures for Moscow. The priority is from now on - according to the remarks of the Foreign Minister of the time, Andreï Kozyrev - "to join the community of the civilized States". Russia unable to maintain to its subsidies on the diets "customers" and Africa moves back in its priorities. The relations with certain African States are tightened at the end of the year 1991, when president, Boris Eltsine, stops any foreign help and requires the immediate refunding of the unpaid debts. With the economic revival in Russia, but also under the effect of the broadmindedness whose proof the new leaders make, the situation gradually will improve.

In any event, even if certain countries were inspired openly by the USSR in their economic and political management, "African socialism" was especially marked by nationalism, the panafricanism and of the strong capacities. It did not imply necessarily an international alignment on the sights of Moscow, if it is not for a hard core made up of Angola at the beginning, of Mozambique, of Ethiopia or then of Somalia. The Africans regretted for a long time that Russia does not grant practically any development aid, being satisfied to propose its support for the fights émancipatrices against colonialism. The economic failures of the nationalizations, the power of the Western economies, the abundance of their financial assistance and the attractivity of their political model contributed to the obliteration of the Russian influence.

3. Return of Russia in Africa under the sign of economic and sedentary pragmatism

It was necessary time so that post-sovietic Russia, whose power was restored, returns to Africa. But it is only into 2001 that one observes the first sign of a tangible interest of postsovietic Russia for Africa. In December, the former Prime Minister (1998-1999) and ex-minister of the Foreign Affairs (1996-1998) Evgueni Primakov, named by new president Vladimir Poutine with the head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia, carry out a round which leads it in Angola, in Namibia, in Tanzania and South Africa (Kalika, 2019: p.20). It will however be necessary still nearly five years so that the first Russian opening of this century occurs on the African continent.

3.1. New orientation of the African policy of Russia (2006 -2013)

The presidency of Dmitri Medvedev (2008-2012) confirms the renewed interest of Moscow for the African continent. The visits of president Poutine in South Africa and Morocco in 2006, then in Libya in 2008, marked the beginning of the great return. Dmitri Medvedev, widened the circle while visiting in 2009 Egypt, Angola, Nigeria and Namibia ("to catch up with" wasted time, he said). The voyages of the Foreign Ministers in the two directions multiplied. A meeting of the ministers and members of Parliament African were organized, without much success, in 2010 in Moscow. But this time, it was not any more question of ideology, if not to proclaim that the modes were taken as they were, and then one did not give lessons. The openings of embassies followed one another, and 40 Russian embassies are mobilized today in Africa to promote the economic interests of Moscow, to rejoin the votes with UNO and to allot purses or training courses. It was a question of opening the door at the large Russian firms in the mining areas or metallurgical, of selling weapons or cereals. Moreover, before even the Western sanctions related to the annexation of the Crimea, Russia

was déjà exporting cereals. The Russian firms thus started to survey the Continent. Apart from the already old presence of *Rusal* in Guinea-Conakry then in Nigeria, one saw appearing *the Renova* consortia in Namibia, South Africa and in Gabon for manganese, *Alrosa* for the research of diamonds in Angola and soon in RCA, *Nornikel* for gold in South Africa and Bostwana and soon undoubtedly in Mali, *Lukoil* for the exploitation of oil in Libya, Côte.d'ivoire and with Ghana, ARMZ for uranium in Tanzania.

But the Russian presence is not limited to the raw materials, it also appears by construction or the levelling of the railroads in Algeria or Libya (project signed at the time of the visit of Poutine in 2008 and put at evil by the Western intervention against Kadhafi), the sale of four nuclear engines in Egypt or the signature of civil cooperation agreements nuclear with a score of African States of which Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda. These contracts want to be the prelude to the sale of power stations by *Rosatom*, including "the small" power stations, whose Russia currently holds the monopoly.

When Vladimir Poutine takes again his districts in the Kremlin in May 2012, Russia thus reappeared in the African landscape, but its return still is limited geographically, economically and politically. It will change scale after 2013, with the favour of the historical reunion with Egypt. Carry of entry of the USSR to Africa and in the Middle East in the middle of the years 1950, then principal ally of Moscow in the Arab world, this country kept its distances with Moscow since the rupture of 1972 initiated by Sadate, even if contacts had been joined again at the end of the years 1990 via Evgueni Primakov. Thus, the bringing together Russo-Egyptian from now on will be articulated mainly around three major axes: sales of weapons, civil nuclear power and co-operation in regional files such as Libya and Syria.

As of November 2013, the Russian Ministers for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Sergueï Choïgou and Sergueï Lavrov, go to Cairo. On this occasion is finalized a first series of contracts of approximately 3 billion dollars (Delanoë, 2016: 38).

3.2. Hard repositioning of Russia the African continent through the renewal of partnerships (2014-2022)

Already sanctioned at the time of the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, Russia of Vladimir Poutine is, since the invasion of the Ukraine on February 24, 2022, confronted with an increasing insulation on behalf of the Western States, Europe and the United States at the head. Indeed, seven waves of measures adopted until up to now and aim at "weakening" the capacity of Moscow to finance the war and "to impose" economic and political costs on the Russian elite, according to the European Commission, which ensures that they "do not block" exports of foodstuffs and agricultural produce. The Western powers agreed on prohibition to import a long list of products in the energy sector (coal and oil), but also of many raw materials and other goods (iron, steel, wood, cement, gold, alcohols, etc). Besides the European Union imposes a prohibition to export advanced technologies (semiconductors, computers, etc), products of luxury, goods and technologies necessary to the refining of oil, energy, or for sea transport. Economic sanctions, without any doubt, aim at the financial system: ousting of certain Russian banks of the system of international exchange Swift, prohibition of public financing or investments in Russia. Also, some measurements touch more than 1200 personalities considered to be close to the Kremlin with a prohibition to enter the European Union their credits held in Europe remain cold.

In this context, coupled with the financial difficulties related to the pandemia of Covid-19. "With its natural resources abundant and close to Europe, its 54 votes with the General meeting of the United Nations [...], Africa are a gravitational arena for Russia within which it can pursue her goals at economic and political costs limited", estimated, in March 2022, the authors of a report/ratio of Tony Blair Institute for Global Exchange devoted to the Russian spheres of influence in Africa (Vittot, 2022: 3).

To mitigate the effects of the sanctions imposed following the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, Russia invests itself more and more in Africa. In Egypt for example, beyond

the Camp David agreements signed in 1979, Cairo received from Washington an annual help of 1,5 billion dollar, mainly to finance the acquisition of military equipment manufactured on the other side of the Atlantic, Russia benefits today from consecutive American disengagement Arab spring to approach president Al-Sissi-Sissi elected in 2014 and to sign a contract of armament of 3,5 billion dollars. In 2019, the two countries sign a contract, which envisages the delivery of Russian fighters Known-35 in Egypt. The United States then warns their Egyptian partner and agitates the threat of sanctions, with the title of the law *Caatsa*, which makes it possible to sanction any entity making deal with the Russian industry of the armament.

If North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Egypt in particular) constitutes well the entrance point of Russia on the continent, it is not today any more the only point of anchoring of Moscow in Africa. The study of the Russian presence in Central African Republic, in Madagascar, in Angola and in Sudan testifies to the evolution of the strategy of Russia in Africa. Since 2017, the stress is laid on the deepening of the sedentary co-operation on the one hand, by the signature of agreements of defense and the deployment of private military companies, and on the media influence on the other hand. This formula proves particularly gravitational for a certain number of African modes wishing to be maintained with the capacity (Vittot, 2022: 8). With the passing of years, Russia succeeded in being essential like a central actor on the continent, by offering in particular an assistance as regards safety less demanding than the Occident (human rights and governance). Moscow thus provided 28 % of the weapons to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa between 2008 and 2017, in front of China (24 %), the Ukraine (8,3 %) and the United States (7,1 %) (Sipri, 2019). It is interesting to stress that China as Russia do not hesitate to sell weapons with countries under embargo, like Sudan and South-Sudan, thus contributing to feed the African conflicts. A contrario, Moscow wished to join in 2008 the military operation of the European Union Chad and in Central African Republic (operation Eufor Tchad/RCA).

Russia seeks nevertheless to diversify the structure of its exchanges by privileging the sectors of high technology. It positions for example on the market of launchings of satellites, on behalf of Angola, in 2017, but also of Tunisia, since 2020. In the field of the civil nuclear power, *Rosatomb* multiplied the agreements with countries firstly-reaching on the installation of dies, for example in Zambia, in Sudan or Rwanda. Russia is also very active in the field of the medical co-operation, testifies the organization to it to vaccination campaigns against the Ebola virus or the export of treatments against Covid-19 (Vittot, 2022: 9).

3.2.1. Dedication of the Russian presence in Africa to the top of Sotchi in 2019

The objective of the first Russia-Africa top in Sotchi these October 23, and 24 2019 was to officially mark the return of Moscow on the African continent. With the program, plethora of African leaders, a very voluntarist speech of the Russian president and, especially, a beautiful occasion for Russia to expose one of the fields in which it excels: the armament.

This top was concluded by the proclamation from ambitious objectives (doubly of trade from here at 2024) and the signature from several bilateral treaties. The final declaration gives a report on "92 agreements, contracts and draft-agreements [...] of a total value of 1 400 billion roubles". In order to dissociate itself from China, marked to involve Africa in surendettement, Moscow proposes its policy of obliteration of the debt, inherited the Soviet time, and its will to found a balanced co-operation, respectful of the sovereignty of the African States. During five last years, Russia thus signed agreements with a score of the countries, most recent being those with Mali (June 2019), the Republic of Congo (May 2019) and Madagascar (October 2018). These agreements envisage the training of officers in Moscow, traditional lever of Russian influence in Africa, the delivery of military materials or the maintenance of equipment already in equipment, of the common exercises, the fight against terrorism and maritime piracy. These components vary according to the situation of the countries and their concerns.

If the opening of permanent military bases in Africa is not on the agenda, Russia starts again in March 2022 a basic project naval in Sudan, which would offer to him a strategic access to the Red Sea. This project, which was to make it possible to accommodate 300 men and to four warships, actually goes back to 2017 but it was suspended following the fall of Omar El-Béchir in 2019. The coup d'état of General Al-Burhane in October 2021 and the return to the capacity of a military junta have rebattu the charts, recreating conditions favorable to a co-operation reinforced with Russia.

In addition to the militaro-sedentary shutter, the greatest success of Russia in Africa east to have improved perception of its role and its media and informational influence by the means of operations of misinformation. This policy of misinformation is based in particular on certain media of State like RT and *Sputnik*, which managed to be essential as sources on the significant audience in many countries. Their leading line insists on the absence of colonial past Russian in Africa and on a pragmatic co-operation without counterparts in terms of governance intern and democratization.

Russia, which carries out in Africa a "hybrid war" combining average conventional and not-conventional, is again regarded as an actor able to offer to his African partners an economic and sedentary co-operation. Moscow is today likely to represent "third a diplomatic way" between the Westerners - generally perceived like intrusive on the question of the human rights.

3.2.2. Deployment in Africa of the instruments of influence of long term

Whereas the concept even of *software power* causes sometimes skepticism in Moscow, Russia deploys in Africa of the instruments of influence of long term. One of the most visible demonstrations of this approach is the role played by certain media of State (RT, *Sputnik*) in languages Frenchwoman (Shaft horse, 2018), English, but also Portuguese, which are essential as sources on significant audience in many countries of the area. Russia is also very active in the field of the medical co-operation: the Russian ministry of Health and RUSAL thus organized a vaccination campaign against the Ebola virus in Guinea. The total assistance of Russia to fight against the epidemic is assembled to 60 million dollars. This subject was also discussed at the time of the visit of Mikhaïl Bogdanov in democratic Republic of Congo in December 2018. A few days earlier, Russia had delivered equipment to Zimbabwe to fight there against an epidemic of cholera.

The assistance of Moscow is generally brought within the framework of multilateral programs of WHO, the world UNICEF or the Funds of fight against the AIDS, tuberculosis and paludism (100 million dollars were poured by Russia with this last). Teaching and the formation represent another pillar of the Russian *software power* in Africa. In 2013, the number of African students according to a university course was estimated at approximately 8 000 (Arkhangelskaya, Shubin, 2013: 20). According to the deputy manager of the Rossotroudnitchestvo Agency in charge of the cultural and scientific radiation of Russia abroad, Alexandre Radkov, nearly 30 000 young Africans deposited candidates' files this year, the quota of free places offered by the Russian government being however limited to 1 819 (Koulikova, 2019: 6).

The sedentary aspect of the Russian policy in Africa is priority even dominating. According to the SIPRI, an independent international institute dedicated to research on the conflicts, the armaments, the control of the armaments and disarmament, Russia delivered, between 2000 and 2015, for 15 billion dollars of weapons in Africa (Korendiassov, 2017), of the figures which do not reflect the last Egyptian contracts nor those concluded recently with Equatorial Guinea for example. According to Dmitri Chougaiëv, director of the federal Service to the co-operation militaro-technique (FSVTS), the wallet of contracts of Rosoboron-export with the only countries of sub-Saharan Africa rose, in 2018, to 3 billion dollars. In addition to the ministry for Defense, another actor is particularly active in the Russo-African sedentary co-operation: Nikolai Patrouchev, the secretary of the Security Council national. It is by its

mediation that the Russian services of information discuss with their African counterparts, in particular in margin of its annual conference on the questions of safety to which it invites representatives of the information agencies of the whole world. It is the case, in May 2019, when one take place with Oufa, of the discussions with the head of the services namibiens, Philemon Malima, like with representatives of the information agencies of Burundi, of Tunisia, of Uganda, of Egypt and Congo.

4. Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the relations between Russia and Africa


The Russian aggression counters the Ukraine which began on February 24, 2022, the greatest military attack against a European country since the Second World war, constituted a turning in the history of the Russo-African relations. The majority of the African countries are countries with low income which suffer more, in particular the poor Africans. The repercussions of this war still will increase the hunger and poverty (Kappel, 2022.). The rise in the prices of energy and the foodstuffs, the reduction of tourism and the potential difficulties of access to the international markets of the capital increase the vulnerability, in particular in the African countries which have a room for minimal political manoeuvre to counter these effects of the external shocks.

4.1. An alarming flight of the prices for food safety

This phenomenon inevitably touches all the economies, independently of their current relations with the markets Russian and Ukrainian. In the short run, the blaze of the prices is likely to be much more alarming than the real shortages of products of first need. The Russo-Ukrainian crisis represents a major risk for food safety and energetics in Africa. A prolonged conflict could still more put in danger corn exports towards the area and continue to make climb the prices. The annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014 had made leap the prices of corn of 25 % in two months, which lets predict extent of the impact to come within the framework from the current conflict.

The current conflict should not occult the fact that, already before the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, the world prices of the foodstuffs reached historical tops, causing a two-digit inflation of the foaad prices: +60% for oils and +30% for cereals on average in 2021 compared to 2020 (FAO). These spectacular rises then had already a disproportionate impact on the households, in particular the urban households poorest. The world food prices were never also high. In March 2022, index FAO of the prices of the foodstuffs, which follow the monthly trend of the international prices of the foodstuffs most usually exchanged in the world, reached its higher level since its creation in 1990, at 159,3 points, that is to say more than 34% of more than its value one year before. Into Egypt, the deficit of exports ukrainiennes of corn results in imports of more than 17 % and the imports of other cereals would decrease by 19 %. South Africa would import 7 % of corn in less and more than 16 % of other cereals in less. The imports of other cereals are also weaker in Cameroun (-14 %), in Algeria and in Libya (-9,6 %). the corn imports would fall appreciably in Ethiopia (-9,6 %), in Kenya (-7,9 %), in Uganda (-7,1 %), in Morocco (-6,2 %) and Mozambique (-6 %) (Heidland, 2022).

Figure 1: Dependency of North Africa with respect to corn of Ukraine and Russia (share of the total corn imports and share in consumption in %)



Thereafter, the high prices of the energy, whose Russia is a significant exporter, also entrainé an increase in the cost of living and transport on the scale of the continent. According to the extent of the mechanisms of fixing of the prices of oil at the national level, the consequences are also made feel on the balances in the budget. On the ten countries most vulnerable to the rise in the price of oil, i.e. very dependent on the imports, eights are fragile States (Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda and Sudan). The price of the gas oil had already more than triplet in mid-March in Nigeria, first oil producer crude in Africa but very depend on the imports.

Also, when the Russian aggression began at the end of February 2022, of many African students in Ukraine tried to flee towards the European countries. However, they were maltreated by the forces of safety Ukrainians through racial shaping and by preventing them from going up on train to cross in the close countries.

4.2. Africa: a simple theatre of strategic confrontation enters the dominant powers?

In the Great play in prospect, Africa seems a marginal entity deprived of means necessary to affect the strategic decisions of the international system. It is as to fear as the African concerns of economic development and political stability are relegated to a second rank, so much the dominant powers would be more inclined to deal with their geopolitical surfaces.

In addition to the risk of marginalisation, Africa could become a theatre of confrontation between foreign powers in search of solidification of their alliances and extension of their influence. On this point, the war in Ukraine acts like an at the same time revealing and accelerating factor. Revealing in the direction where the competitions between the world powers in the African continent were already observed. Thus, the notable opening carried out by Russia in a certain number of African countries such as Libya, the Republic of Central Africa and Mali, and the return of its marine of war in the Mediterranean and Rouge, where the talks with Sudan for the construction of a naval base were very advanced, had irritated the Occident. Similar, the presence economic, financial and military Chinese in Africa is looked of an eye very skeptic by the Western powers (Machrouh, 2022: 6).

In this reconfiguration of the reports/ratios of force, it is not to exclude that the three powers would seek to increase their African ground competitions substantially. The stake would be at the same time to secure the votes of a rich continent of its 54 seats in the

international organizations, and to exert a kind of control on the raw materials African to guarantee their respective strategic autonomies. The "African tank" could be, as an example, requested by the Western pole to prevent Russia to use of its capacities of hydrocarbons and foodstuffs as a weapon, on the one hand, and to refuse, or at least to limit the access of China to the natural resources of Africa in the intention slowing down its rise to fulgurating power, on the other hand (Machrouh, 2022: 6).

Russia still does not have a "African policy" on the scale of the continent. Its principal economic interests and of safety remain largely concentrated in North Africa, in spite of the efforts, moreover rather coherent, aiming at developing its bonds in Southern Africa. Zone where it has old contacts, many and high level but which are long up to now in taking effect on the commercial level. The rise to power of the sedentary shutter, which goes hand in hand with the increasing implication of the ministry for the Defense and the Security Council national, raises the question of the overall coordination of the Russian approaches. In the same way, the great active groups Russian in Africa play their partition in solo up to now, which reflects at the same time the competitions between the oligarchs concerned, but also the practice of the bulk-heading at these often official entities, which operate in significant sectors. The community of the Russian Africanists, it, is parcelled out, very few, and its weight within the bureaucracy in Moscow remains still weak, consequence of the prolonged disinterest of the Kremlin for the continent. The mobilization for the Forum of businesses and the top of Sochi, all the same contributed to make evolve/move the things. But the stake for the actors of the Russia-Africa relations will be to maintain the degree of implication of the machine of State on a level raised in the duration.

5. Conclusion

The will to develop all kinds of relations with Africa, in particular soldiers, culminated with the top of Sochi in 2019. At the time of this meeting, and throughout the period 2015-2019, Russia presented itself at the Africans like strong and proud of its success in Syria, going until evoking the quality of the Russian armament tested with the combat. However, the relations of Russia with Africa are old, going up at least in XVIe century, but they took an institutional character only at the end of the XIXe century. At the time, Russia sends an official military aid to Ethiopia and opens a diplomatic legation there. The chronology of the bonds between Russia and Africa indicates that the posture with regard to Europe initially, and the Occident in the second time, determines the degree of implication of Russia and the calendar of its actions in Africa. For the tsars, the Soviets or Poutine, Africa is a theatre of confrontation with the Occident and fight against the European projects. In other words, Russia is in a race for its strategic positioning in Africa. The Summit and economic Forum Russia-Africa are a "weapon" of the Russian diplomatic offensive. Moreover, the voyages of Sergueï Lavrov in Egypt, in Republic of Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia are a tangible example of positioning geostrategic in Africa and a message tending to show that Russia maintains its position on the international scene in spite of the many sanctions of Europe and its allies.

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