

THE GEOPOLITICS OF REPRESENTATIONS: DEFINING IS RULING STUDY CASE: SOME OF A NATION'S MAIN LINES OF REPRESENTATION ABROAD – ANTON GOLOPENȚIA

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Abstract: *What if considering culture, the fifth theater of strategic operations? - the fourth being the cyberspace, alongside with air, ground and sea traditional theatres of operations. The fifth theatre of operations is, more precisely, about controlling/defending/targeting the cultural space of a society, the DEFSPACE. This is the realm of the Geopolitics of Representations, the distribution of culturally vectorized power over a certain geography. Some of the invoked theories are Lacoste/Gourdin' Geopolitics of Representations, Goffman's stigma, Buzan's societal security, Putnam's social capital. In the end Anton Golopenția's revolutionary theory of state cohesion will be briefly resurfaced. The short schema of "defining is ruling" is the following: any state is glued around to a certain idea – the "idea of state" where its culturally defined DNA of legitimacy is stored. This glue effect is manifesting itself through the processes of bonding and bridging, the stronger they are, a stronger social capital a country has. The stronger the social cohesion (social capital) the better it is the national security status. One of the main inhibitors of bridging and bonding is stigmatizing, the process of debasing the collective self-esteem by manipulating certain definitions at the macro-cultural level, in particular. Anton Golopenția's approach towards building the idea of state at the spiritual level is of particular interest, since he writes down in very close detail the main axis of representing the idea of state.*

Key words: *geopolitics; culture; symbols; national security.*

1. The Premises

Anton Golopenția, one of the founding fathers of Romanian Geopolitics, stated after his German professors (Hans Freyer, 1933 apud Golopenția, 2002: 13) that "ruling is planning", or, I would say, defining is ruling. Given the legitimacy of state based on its social function as protector of the public interest, I propose the

following basic operationalization of “defining is ruling”, as premise for further discussion on the subject matter:

1st: protecting/targeting citizens means defending/attacking their national identity, too (Smith).

2nd: the national identity is at the core of the legitimacy/idea of state (Buzan/Smith).

3rd: protecting/targeting a society and its citizens is also about the definitions of which the relational structure of society, its (national) identity are made of.

The First and the Second premises are in the general line of argument specified by Anthony Smith. Smith states very clearly that *there is no legitimacy of power without serving the nation*:

In the nowadays context of globalization “... nations and nationalisms are necessary, if unpalatable, instruments for controlling the destructive effects of massive social change; they provide the only large-scale and powerful communities and belief-systems that can secure a minimum of social cohesion, order and meaning in a disruptive and alienating world. Moreover, **they are the only popular forces that can legitimate and make sense of the activities of that most powerful modern agent of social transformation, the rational state.** (A. Smith, 2007: 4, underlines added)

The Third premise is about the main logic of the Geopolitics of Representations which is discussed further on. It is about its practical (political and strategical), theoretical justification, and its object of analysis: about the ideas that shape power over a certain territory. In the same time, the Third Premise points at the weakest point of defense during peacetime: the collective identity, specifically, *national identity*. Since the collective identity is the framework of social relationships, including individuals and the state, we may say with Anthony Smith: “Today national identity is the main form of collective identification. Whatever the feelings of individuals, it provides the dominant criterion of culture and identity, the sole principle of government and the chief focus of social and economic activity.” (Smith, 1991: 170)

I will unfold the premises in the Argument below.

2. The theoretical framework

The Geopolitics of Representations is about the power of defining space. As Yves Lacoste (in Gourdin, 2016) stated about the power of ideas which are able to shape territories:

“In order to understand a conflict or a geopolitical rivalry, there is not enough to chart its game, but its rationale, the ideas of its main actors, especially when it has complex causes, each of these having an impact on the spiritual realm it represents. In Geopolitics, the role of ideas – even of the fake ones – is huge, for they

explain, alongside with the material items, the strategic choices. This kind of ideas we will call *representations*...”¹

Close enough, Barry Buzan was demonstrating that the “idea of state” is at the peak of the state structure itself, along with the “physical base of the state” and the “institutional expression” of it (Buzan, 2000 (1991): 75). Moreover, the representation of the state itself, *as a mass imprinted idea* is at the core of the state:

“Without a widespread and quite deeply-rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions by themselves would have great difficulty functioning and surviving. ... Tracing the essence of the state to the social level gives us a major clue about how to approach the idea of national security. If the heart of the state resides in the idea of it held in the minds of the population. Then that idea itself becomes a major object of national security.” (Buzan, 1991: 39).

Long before them, Anton Golopenția was convinced that the Encyclopedia and the Atlas are the best instruments to “accommodate the individual with his nationhood, life and the world...” In 1938, Anton Golopenția wrote: “Our nationhood is enriched not by another Romanian Encyclopedia², but with an Encyclopedia *of* Romania. ... It is not an alphabetic dictionary of definitions and data ... It is about this round representation of this political individuality whose name is Romania. ... Those who are scientists must know much of everything ... The others need knowledge suited for each of them. Knowledge able to clear their life horizon: to place them in the nationhood, life, the world. ... The enterprise of Saint-Simon and Comte, who believed that beyond science the scientist has the mission of *reorganizing* the conceptions and criteria for the social action, it is more necessary than ever.”³ (Golopenția, 2002: 133).

¹ “...pour comprendre un conflit ou une rivalité géopolitique, il ne suffit pas de préciser et de cartographier ses enjeux, il faut aussi essayer [...], surtout quand les causes sont complexes, de comprendre les raisons, les idées de ses acteurs principaux [...], chacun traduisant et influençant à la fois l'état d'esprit de la partie de l'opinion publique qu'il représente. Le rôle des idées – même fausses – est capital en géopolitique car ce sont elles qui expliquent les projets et qui, autant que les données matérielles, déterminent le choix des stratégies. Ces idées, nous les appelons des REPRÉSENTATIONS...”

² *The Encyclopedia of Romania* in 6 projected volumes was printed in 1938-1943. Under the coordination of Dimitrie Gusti, the head of the Bucharest Sociological School, only four volumes were finished. The project was the first and the last Romanian project of this kind.

³ The full Romanian text:

“Neamul nostru se îmbogățește, nu cu o altă *Enciclopedie* românească, ci cu o *Enciclopedie a României*. Lucrarea aceasta nouă nu urmează tradiția deschisă prin marea *Enciclopedie* franceză a lui Diderot și d’Alembert [1751]. Nu e un dicționar alfabetic de definiții și de informații. ... Ci înfățișarea unitară a acelei mari individualități politice care se cheamă România. ... Ceea ce poate prilejui *Enciclopedia României* întrece, însă, cu mult ceea ce are de dat o *Enciclopedie-dicționar*. Cititorul ei, cel care o citește din scoarță în scoarță, de la vol I la al VI-lea – căci se cere citită și nu consultată – se familiarizează cu chiar viața nației românești. ... “Cel ce e de meserie om de știință trebuie să știe despre multe și despre toate,

I will present some his key points for a nation's *practical* representation abroad in the Study case below.

The Geopolitics of Representations is another elites' important job. From this point of view, this Geopolitics may be part of the broader Sociology of Elites, as an instrument by which the space is organized, defended, cared of by judiciously making use of a certain stock of ideas. As the president of the Romanian Academy, Ioan Aurel Pop stated: "The elites cannot build out of nothing a nation, but they can organize a nation. The same way the Church of Densus⁴ is made of Roman materials, the same way the modern nationhood – organized and fortified by our political and intellectual elites – is built upon the rocks and bricks of «aspirations, longings, aversions, passions and needs» (Alexander Davila), all of them belonging to the «old tradition», i.e. from the depths of a nation."⁵ (Pop, 2019: 32)

Now we may easier understand the next ingredient to this approach to the Geopolitics of Representations - introducing Goffman's Stigma: what happens with a nation's security if the bricks of its identity are hijacked, molested, diminished? The Goffmanian mechanics of stigma stress the fact that stigmatization is related to the process of *estrangement*. Stigma does not operate without a target. Its favorite target is *the stranger* or makes the other feels like a stranger. "While the stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind – in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an attribute is a stigma, especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive; sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap." (Goffman, 1986: 2).

I will consider the Goffmanian paradigm from a geopolitical point of view by considering the following problems:

ca să nu-l găsească nepregătit cererile. Ceilalți au nevoie de cunoștințe potrivite lor. De cunoștințe care să le lămurească zarea vieții lor: să-i situeze în neam, în viață, în lume. ... Se scrie și se tipărește azi numai în perspectiva omului de știință. Analitic și fragmentar. Întreprinderea unor Saint-Simon și Comte, care credeau că, dincolo de munca în specialitate, omul de știință are misiunea de a *reorganiza* concepțiile și criteriile diriguitoare ale acțiunii, a devenit și mai acut necesară azi."

⁴ One of the oldest still standing in Romania, the St. Nicholas Church is still in use and it was built at the beginning of Middle Ages from stones taken from the Roman Capital of Dacia – Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, being built on the site of a Roman temple, or by converting a pagan Roman temple

⁵ "Elitele nu pot construi din nimic o națiune, dar pot organiza o națiune. Așa cum biserica de la Densus este făcută din materiale romane, la fel edificiul numit națiune modernă – organizat și fortificat de elitele noastre politice și intelectuale - are drept pietre de temelie și cărămizi «năzuințe, doruri, vise, ure, patime, nevoi» (Alexandru Davila), care vin toate din «datina străbună», adică din adâncul existenței acestui popor."

1. Estranging a country/state from its people, or from some of its relevant demographics, at least.

2. Stigmatizing the image of the country/state for its own citizens by making it to look pitiful.

These two will be developed in chapter 4. I will pinpoint some of this mechanism below, by discussing the idea of state.

3. The state: its fundamentals

The state is an elaborate institution with a very large corpus of theories and approaches, including geopolitics. What I intend to stress here, from the standing point of Geopolitics of Representations, is that the difference between a weak and a strong state lies with the

- power of the idea of state,
- and the using of it.

We remember the Buzan's "component parts of state": "the physical base of the state", "the institutional expression of the state" and "the idea of the state" (Buzan, 1983: 40). A weak state has a less coherent society. This is why the national security lies more with societal security than the military power of numbers in tanks, police-force and so on: "The principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government. In other words, weak states either do not have or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation." (idem: 67)

Krasner (2006: 153-155) put it more clearly: what makes a state to be itemized as a *weak state* is its ability to serve the public interest in an institutionalized form. Lacking good governance, that is strong, capable institutions is one of the most evident traits of the weak and failed states. The opposite of the weak state is not necessarily *more power*, but *good governance*.

Summarizing, *good governance*, as the institutionalization of the idea of state by serving the public interest is another pragmatic aspect of the Geopolitics of Representations. A state cannot have good governance, that is strong and capable institutions serving the public good, without a solid idea of state appealing to its people. The idea of state is not only but also a public relations product. It is a byproduct of the social capital, of the society in itself. The main blocker of its production is a set of bad definitions of the social space, the most toxic of it being *stigma*.

4. Defining is ruling. The DEFSPACE

The Geopolitics of Representations is about controlling the cultural definitions of a certain space or society. I will use the shortcut DEFSPACE to denominate the object of this geopolitics.

The Geopolitics of Representations belongs to the national security, to the “idea of state” (Buzan) precisely. It is the realm of strategic choices in the zone of education, the press, the ideologies and symbolic loyalties. And yes, like Yves Lacoste put it, it has the power of reshaping space. I would add: the most economical aggression is shaping the enemy’s territory by making him/her to mobilize his/her resources towards *your* goals. By hijacking the legitimate idea of state, that is, by stigmatizing it using high-profile intellectuals, journalists, politicians, from the target country. Make the enemy country being an enemy for itself. That would be the mantra of the Geopolitics of Representations seen from a country like Romania, a disputed territory by different toxic narratives of how to despise being Romanian.

The Geopolitics of Representations belongs to the capability of power projection of a state by vectorizing the collective mentalities at two levels:

1. Internally, by securing/targeting the idea of state;
2. Externally, by securing/targeting the favorability corridors necessary for the main political activity,

where the collective mentalities encompass the collective imaginary, the national mythology, the ideas of order and hierarchy, the general legitimacy of the political action.

The Geopolitics of Representations is a powerful tool for maneuvering, storing, and using the definitions regarding a target space, both internally (domestic policy) and externally (international relations). Briefly, Geopolitics of Representations is about protecting, securing or attacking a society *per se*, in order to protect/capture its state, at the level of ideas and public sentiments, using not only psycho-technology, but culture, its main definitions, to be precise. Like any branch of geopolitics, this one too, is about space, or territory. The main difference from the any other type of projecting power over a specific territory, as we already have seen, is the instrument of power: culture (definitions).

As regards the relationship between the objective and the hypothesis, it was attempted to maintain in the same sphere of study. Starting from the observations in the literature and the framework objective of the paper, we assumed that:

4.1. The instruments of defining in order to rule the society (a territory)

In order to control the DEFSPACE, there are several instruments available:

- The cultural process of defining institutions. Every institution has an image, related to its public functions, the most important being its *legitimacy*. The most important institution is the state, and the critical definition is Buzan’ “idea of state.” The definitions of institutions are *the*

space of the actual working-order. The complement of the idea of state is the *nationhood*, the idea of the collective identity called *nation*, including its history, supposed “mission”, the cultural complex of the “national mythology.” Nationhood is *the space* of the collective self-perception.

- The physical form of definitions – Atlases, Encyclopedias, representative books (or “narratives”), the media and some of the cultural activities. what we will call *physical vectors or representations*.
- The network vector – the sociologic of representations, that is, the social constructs, the commands and their jamming regarding certain ideas which are propagated by various social networks.
- *The psychological vector* – the collective sentiments, perceptions, around certain ideas, conceptions, paradigms.

4.2. Defining and the Power of Labeling. Who rules our definitions?

Defining a certain territory (culturally, historically, educationally, militarily, etc.) has the power of mobilizing/demobilizing the masses around a core of ideas on identity, most notably around the legitimacy of the state and the self-esteem of the person as part of its nation. The different types of definitions are power parts of the state (components of the state power). The Gusti School of Sociology was developed around the idea that the core of a nation is the “social will” carried out by people shaped by their own consciousness, that is, by cultural values: “Nationhood, according to the founder of the Sociological School of Bucharest, Dimitrie Gusti, is the people with the social will, the result of certain coherent and systematic manifestations, according with a goal system. ... Nationhood is an active social entity which put at work its framework of potentialities, resulting in political, juridical, economical and spiritual manifestations. Neither the society, nor the nationhood could be thought of without the social will. If the social will cannot express itself, the people is decaying to its primitive state, as a bio-historical potentiality.” (Baltasiu, 2007: 397)

The higher the cultural values, goals, or ideals, the clearer the difference between means and goals. Only an ethnic group with higher goals/cultural values mobilized through the social will constitute the nationhood. Otherwise, they are not an ethnic group, either, since an ethnic group is agglutinated around a common language and a set of customs, including the consciousness of a common blood (ancestry). The people are becoming a mere statistical population.

Populations are statistical agglutinations of individuals with no symbolic coherence. A community is downgrading to the mere statistical population status by weakening its collective identity, its national consciousness, mainly. The major factor contributing to the phenomena is the lack of a proper political project, to work for, and as a watchtower for what keeps people together.

By controlling the definitions belonging to the collective identity one can control the society.

4.3. The Negative Definition: Stigma (Goffman)

There are some bipolar terms on which the social equilibrium of a state is based:

- Trusty-Discreditable
- Dignity-Stigma

Stigma is the drastic weakening of the social (collective) identity by manipulating some key attributes, symbols, of the self-esteem. In order to properly manipulate them, that is, to effectively disarm culturally a society must be fulfilled two stages of *stigmatization*:

- Being discreditable
- Being discredited proper. (see Goffman, 1986: 2)

Both are converging into the action called *discrediting*.

Goffman: "The term stigma, then, will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not attributes, is really needed." (Goffman, 1986: 109)

From a Geopolitical point of view, stigmatizing is dissolving the social coherence by discrediting the symbolic base of the social fabric. The sense of belonging is part of the personal identity, too. At the individual level, stigma means a very weak personal psychological state, as a result of the very low level of trust in the collective potential: "*there is nothing you can do here, in this country, with its people*" / "We have a beautiful country, it is a pity that is inhabited" / "Bypass God the Romanians" are some variations of the same mantra.

Having no trust or faith in the social fabric, there will be no durable bridging and bonding, that is, the social capital of that country will be dramatically affected.

Robert Putnam: "Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called «civic virtue.»" (Putnam, 2000: 18)

While bonding refers to the "strong in-group loyalty" (idem: 23), bridging is about "to connect with people unlike ourselves." (idem: 411)

Bridging and bonding can be operationalized by the statistical indicator of volunteering. There is no surprise that Romania has among the lowest score of volunteering in the European Union, with a serious drop in the last years. Take for instance one of the most popular activities: sports.

Putnam's bridging and bonding add further clarification, deepening the drama of dissolving the social framework. Concluding this chapter, I may say that, from a geo-strategic point of view, less bridging and bonding due to stigma mean

less loyalty to the idea of state, which, in turn, means less governability. There is a clear connection between Putnam’s social capital paradigm, Goffman’s stigma, and Buzan’s approach to societal security: stigma downgrades the quality of social connections, resulting in weaker social capital; less social capital means less trust and less mutuality which, in turn, translate into less institutional legitimacy (institutions are made of people). Less legitimacy due to downgrading trust and social bonding/bridging means also a weaker idea of state, which is, in turn, a national security problem.




Fig. 1. Volunteering in the EU 28 (sports). Weak bonding and bridging translate into low volunteering. Bridging and bonding are main parts of the social capital which, in turn, is essential for national security.

Source: Statista.com.

5. Types of weak collective groups and societies

Here are some of the collective forms of action easier to manipulate using various forms of Representations, with a very sensitive DEFSPACE.

5.1. The invented community (Anderson)

Anderson's view on nationhood is not that powerful as, for instance, the Buzan's paradigm. For him, almost any community is invented, nation in particular. His theory can be useful in studying those estranged-of-themselves communities or some of the techniques of estrangement. Using stigma or other tools of debasement of collective identity is to commoditize the very components of the collective self, by making it a mere process of imagination, like any other piece of marketing: *an invented community*. Everything is imagined, that is, everything is questionable and replaceable. It becomes a commodity, *an object of doubt*. On the other hand, the invented community is not the byproduct of stigma only. It could be also the result of over-ideologizing the history, the national politics. From this perspective, inventing mythology in order to bolster the national feeling can be a treacherous adventure. In the meantime, the invented communities are easier to handle (manipulate) by discursive means, since they are the byproduct of a discourse with no real symbolical roots.

There are some traits of an invented community as observed in the field are:

- the coherence is based on the feeling of ethnic supremacism;
- of the utmost importance is the "ethnic reproduction" of itself, and
- in itself, the community promoting self-segregation by stigmatizing the Other;
- the collective expectations are excessively ideologized and historicized, the collective memory being overstimulated and the social action being almost exclusively oriented towards reinventing an overrated past (see Baltasiu et al, 2013).

5.2. The *Groupthink* effect (Janis) applied to large communities

Janis' group think is, in fact, a paradox: how a strong group is a weak one. The key factor is the nature of its cohesion, based on social pressure towards uniformity. In fact, there is the same difference between weak states based on the use of force and strong state based on social cohesion (Buzan, 1983: 66).

Group think is a concept coined by Irving Janis and refers to the "deterioration in mental efficiency reality testing, and moral judgments as a result of group pressures". (Janis: 1971). The most obvious factor here is forcing conformity which escalates into constrained unanimity. There is the context of group attraction and leaders' strong positions which hinder any critical analysis. "One of the most common [trait of groupthink] ... appears to be that of remaining loyal to the group by sticking with the policies to which the group has already committed itself, even

when those policies are obviously working out badly and have unintended consequences that disturb the conscience of each member. This is one of the key characteristics of groupthink.” (ibid.)

Group think has the following characteristics: the illusion of group invulnerability and that group cannot make errors; the effort to discard any contradictory information; stereotypical judgments against other social groups; pressure to adopt the dominant perspective; the self-reinforcing illusion of unanimity which in turns reinforce the dominant perspective; the so-called *mind guards* – individuals who take care to protect the group from contradictory or divergent information. (ibid.)

In certain circumstances, the more a community is invented the more is susceptible to display the *groupthink effect*, that is sensitive to the manipulation of representations.

An invented community is highly disciplined in a sense susceptible to act more like a herd than an organized network of individual actions based on consensus, since the rational individual thinking is almost entirely annihilated.

A country, like Romania is riddled with some communities confiscated by irredentist ideologies which have groupthink like behavior in the framework of an invented nationalistic community.

5.3 Romania between weak and invented communities

Romania’ society seems to be split between the two forms of weak society: stigmatized and invented. It seems that, from a geopolitical point of view, there is a serious issue of internal coherence. The societal security is at a historical minimum.

The consensus engine in a weak community alongside fear, could be auto-stigmatization, a kind of negative definition discussed above. The community has lost its self-esteem as a community and its leaders are seen as reproducing the patterns of self-stigmatization: “the country is in tatters”, “there is nothing we can do”, “the good things are foreign only” (mostly Western).

The weak community is on the verge of losing its structural coherence. I briefly pinpointed the issue when I discussed the bridging/bonding issue of the social capital. If the bridging/bonding pair is weak, the social coherence must be based on the negative side of sociality, such as fear and amnesia about the collective identity. *The practical aspect* of the negative identity issue is the mass migration of Romanians, the highest in Europe⁶, one of the highest in the world, comprising about half of the most active working force. When trust in your own society and state is at their lowest, there is an elusive loyalty towards the most important element of identity: your land. For emigrating means also in some case rejecting the symbols which are at the very base of your own state.

⁶ Official European statistics counts 19,7% of Romanians as leaving in other EU countries. The figure is the highest in the EU. (Eurostat, 2018)

What to do about this identity-issue? Anton Golopenția stated in the 30s of the 20th century a multilayered answer: economic, intellectual, political. At the core of the state efficiency, as protector of the public interest, and on the long term, lies *the spiritual unity* of the country (“unitatea sufletească”), and this should be operationalized by *special infrastructure works* able to effectively link the various provinces of the country (Golopenția, 2002 (1938): 346). The infrastructure’s role is to “stimulate de the Romanians initiatives” in order “to make use of the economic intelligence” of the people, to “sustain the development” of the local bourgeoisie and of the free lancers (liberal professions) etc. (idem: 344). But above all, there is an urgent need for: “Great myths and deeds, these are the only effective solution to the problem” of a solid idea of state. (idem: 329). Special cultural institutions like the Atlas and Encyclopedia are to be devised, as we already have seen (Chapter 2, and 4.1).

6. Case Study. How to (re)build the idea of state? Anton Golopenția

Anton Golopenția, one of the most capable members of the Bucharest School of Sociology (1918-1948), laid down the foundations of a veritable science of exhibiting a country abroad. Working with concrete and decoration, photos, statistics and special aesthetic arrangements, Golopenția sought actively to express the very nature of the country on a multilevel axis, consisting in symbols and facts. I consider the scheme presented below good for training in Geopolitics of Representation and for operating with the collective self-esteem. In fact, the manual below is to be seen as a starting point in dealing with a weak definition of identity, by effectively organizing it in the field.

In 1934, in a letter to the founder of the School, Dimitrie Gusti, the High Commissioner of Romania for the exhibitions abroad, regarding the necessary arrangements for the Universal Exhibitions in Berlin, Golopenția (2012: 397-408) stated that an international exhibition should:

1. Represent the whole nationhood;
2. Include all the ethnic areas, including the historical communities, not part of the actual state;
3. Have as a focal point the process of Unification of the Romanian provinces as the result of people’s will not the byproduct of chance;
4. Not represent the county as a “folklore reservation”: “We do not want to be considered a folkloric reservation. We have accomplished enough in the last 150 years [to show] ...” (Golopenția, 2012: 405)
5. Keep the public always connected “in fortissimo” with the exhibition (idem: 406);
6. Use statistics not per se, but as a diplomatic tool to keep alive the public attention;

7. Be considered a propaganda tool, not a scientific treaty of the displayed country;
8. Make use of specialists who know “what is all about”, “to whom to ask for info”, and “know how to use it”;
9. Not be funny nor too aesthetic per se but Romanian and energetic, in order to inculcate an attitude of special composure of gravity.

Of course, the Golopenția’ point of view is Romanian centered, related to the state effort to strengthen the legitimacy of the Great Unification of the 1918, which we nowadays are taking for granted, but we shouldn’t.

Further on, the above axis of representing the country should be centered around the following concepts of the *applied* Geopolitics of Representations:

1. The Space
2. The People (as an anthropo-ethnic reality)
3. The history of statehood as a series of *life* stories.
4. The present-day state *with* the socio-cultural *and* economical life.

Each of these directions is vividly described with the aim of properly represent a whole country in a relatively small time-space frame.

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